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ABSTRACT
This thesis contains an analysis of the last five years of
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Weapon System Accuracy Trial (WSAT)
data from both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet. The analysis is
conducted in an effort to provide recommendations to be applied
toward future evolution of the ASW Test Program for surface ships.
A statistical chi-square test is conducted on Fleet and Navy wide
data to determine which ASW combat system material categories are
most prone to degradation. Additionally, a critical examination of
the existing WSAT data base is provided with an aim toward
promoting future statistical analysis. Results of this thesis
indicate that degradation to weapons delivery systems like torpedo
tubes and ASROC launchers is statistically more significant than
the other WSAT test categories. The thesis also recommends new ways
tto adapt the existing WSAT data base to conduct more informative
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. WEAPONS SYSTEM ACCURACY TRIAL (WSAT) BACKGROUND
1. History
The history of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Weapon
System Test program for surface ships dates back to post World
War II studies of ineffective torpedoes, sensor alignment
errors, and fire control accuracy problems. Presentation
materials obtained from the Undersea Warfare Museum in
Keyport, Wa. indicate initial systems level tests conducted on
Dabob Bay, Washington as early as 1959 led to the
establishment of WSAT tests and began the genesis of the
surface ship ASW test program. Presently, WSAT is a total
system test which demonstrates the ability of a ship's ASW
combat system to pass prescribed equipment performance
standards tests. The total test concept is shown in Figure 1.










Figure 1. WSAT Overview
2. Responsibilities
Commander Naval Seas Systems Command (NAVSEA 06UT) has
overall responsibility for WSAT and is the activity
responsible for surface ship ASW system certification and
recertif ication. The WSAT results are used by NAVSEA as a
basis for granting this certification. ASW certification is
required on every surface ship ASW combat system subsequent to
new construction and commissioning. Similarly, ASW system
recertification is required on existing surface ships which
hold an ASW required operational capability upon exiting
regular overhaul (ROH) or upon receiving a major ASW system
suite upgrade in some other industrial period. Commander
Naval Underwater Systems Center (NUSC) , Newport, Rhode Island
is designated as the WSAT program technical direction agent
(TDA) responsible for all WSAT test and analysis procedures
and documentation.
The WSAT organization supports both Atlantic and
Pacific Fleet units. Surface ship WSAT inspections on the
East coast are conducted by NUSC technicians at either the
Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility (AFWTF) 3-D
underwater range near St. Croix with dockside tests at Naval
Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico or at the Atlantic
Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) 3-D range in the
Bahamas with dockside tests done in Port Everglades, Florida.
Surface ship WSAT inspections on the West coast are
accomplished by technicians from Naval Undersea Warfare
Engineering Station (NUWES) detachment San Diego, California
on the San Clemente Island 3-D Underwater Range (SCIUR) with
dockside tests at Naval Station San Diego or Naval Station
Long Beach. In the Hawaii area, inspections are done by NUWES
detachment Hawaii on the Barking Sands 3-D Tactical Undersea
Range (BARSTUR) with dockside tests done at Naval Station
Pearl Harbor.
3. Objectives
NAVSEA Publication OD 40087 [Ref. l:pp. 1-1], the ASW
WSAT program manual defines the objectives of the WSAT program
as follows:
• To ensure each surface ship ASW system reaches the fleet
in satisfactory condition and is able to meet its assigned
operating capabilities.
• To identify system defects prior to the expiration of
contractual industrial warranties.
• To develop and analyze data on system specifications and
tolerances and refine the same.
• To identify the appropriate command or agency responsible
when system discrepancies degrade performance.
• To promote meaningful system improvement programs.
4. Inspection Sequence Of Events
When the Type Commander requires a WSAT conducted on
one of his ships it is accomplished via request through the
Fleet Commander scheduling system in conjunction with the
responsible WSAT agency. The responsible activity then
assembles a stock test plan for the ship based on its
configuration. Accordingly, the scope of the inspection
varies, based not only on the ASW suite installed, but also on
the inspectors available at inspection time. The WSAT
consists of four inspection phases culminated with exercise
weapons firings on an instrumented 3-D range to evaluate total
ASW system dynamic performance. The WSAT consists of both
dockside and underway testing, evaluation, and analysis. A
summary of each WSAT inspection phase is provided as follows:
• Phase I (5-7 Days Dockside)
1. Arrival conference and eguipment set up.
2. ASW fire control operability and accuracy checks.
3. Internal sonar alignment checks.
4. ASW system interface tests and alignments.
5. Gyrocompass and inertial navigation error tests.
6. Onload of exercise weapons and range instrumentation.
• Phase II (1 Day Dockside)
1. Fire control and torpedo tube interface tests.
2. Tube firing voltage and launch pressure tests.
3. Dummy MK-4 6 torpedo firings on each tube.
4. Measurement of weapon exit velocity.
5. Weapon recovery, inspection, and preset verifications.
• Phase III (1-2 Days Underway)
1. 3-D range Sensor Accuracy Test (SAT)
2. Calibration of electromagnetic log.
3. Gyroscope and inertial navigation heading checks.
• Phase IV (1 Day Underway)
1. Total system end-to-end test on 3-D range.
2. MK-46 over the side exercise torpedo firing.
3. Exercise ASW rocket (ASROC) firing from each launcher
4. Helicopter exercise torpedo firing (if so equipped)












































Figure 2. WSAT Firing Exercise Summary
Upon completion of the WSAT
,
test results are promulgated
in the following manner:
• WSAT quicklook message report (24 Hours)
1. Identifies all major, uncorrected discrepancies.
• WSAT final message report (10 Days)
1. Identifies all remaining uncorrected deficiencies.
2. Recommends corrective action on problems.
3. Provides NAVSEA recommendation for certification.
5. Record Keeping
After the WSAT final report message is received by the
cognizant inspection activity it is tracked until major
discrepancies prohibiting certification are cleared (if
certification is not initially achieved) . At that time NAVSEA
issues a certification statement for the ship concerned. Then
the inspecting activity files the hard copy of the WSAT final
report message in its respective technical library. NAVSEA
(06UT) then utilizes the ASW test program data base for
storage of pertinent WSAT information. NAVSEA, NUSC, and
NUWES detachments are the holders and users of this
microcomputer based data base. It will be described and
evaluated in Chapter III of this analysis.
B. WSAT PROBLEMS
1. Cost
In recent years funding limits have precluded
accomplishment of WSAT on all required ships, particularly
those older ships exiting an industrial environment.
Interviews with officials at NAVSEA have clarified the policy
that all ships with ASW missions will receive WSAT or some
reduced scope facsimile thereof rather than inspect just a few
ships with a complete WSAT. Currently, AEGIS and BURKE class
new construction and SPRUANCE class ASW suite conversions are
receiving priority for funding. As a result of funding
problems, older,
less ASW oriented,
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This is of concern since most of these ships are tentatively
scheduled to remain on the active duty roster through the year
2000. Figure 3 provides fiscal year 1992 budget estimates of
West coast WSAT costs based on required inspections forecast
in the ASW test program data base. Force downsizing will be
providing relief with the ongoing decommissioning of all KNOX
class frigates as well as the COONTZ and ADAMS class guided
missile destroyers. As for the non-AEGIS cruisers of the
LEAHY and BELKNAP class which will remain on active duty in
the near future, the April 1992 Navy Times [Ref. 2: p. 4]
outlined Washington Navy proposals to possibly remove or at
least deactivate sonar and ASW weapons systems from these
ships. This effort will cut operations and maintenance costs
and take a step toward eliminating obsolete systems from the
fleet. It would also free up additional training facilities
ashore and provide cost savings in the manpower area. The
overall result with respect to ASW test programs would be
fewer ships to certify.
2. Redundant Inspections
An additional problem effecting complete funding of
required WSAT inspections is that of redundant inspections.
The current impetus at NAVSEA is to eliminate redundant
inspections, or at least to consolidate testing where possible
to promote greater fiscal efficiency. An example of this is
the AN/SQS-89(V) surface ship ASW suite certification. This
initial acceptance certification, which contains many of the
same testing elements as WSAT, pertains to new ship
construction programs and is intended to ensure specifications
are met satisfactorily. This program is an important part of
acguisition quality assurance policies in the Navy's dealings
with outside vendors. Interview with Mr. Bob Devon of
NAVSEACENPAC indicates that early timing of this certification
with respect to crew training and arrival onboard from
precommissioning sites may preclude substitution for WSAT in
whole. However, some portions of the testing are candidates
for consolidation in WSAT testing. Another example of this is
the ASW Systems Qualification Trials (SQT) , a part of the
greater Combat System Shipboard Qualification Trials (CSSQT)
.
Defined under NAVSEAINST 9093. 1A, CSSQT encompasses the entire
weapons suite and is heavily oriented to both operations and
maintenance training. Although a favorite of the fleet due to
the expansive scope of services, exercise shots, and training
opportunities, NAVSEA has emphasized its responsibility for
material readiness and not for training. Although no cost
figures were available on CSSQT or ASW SQT, it is certain that
costs are several times that of WSAT alone. Despite the fact
that CSSQT and ASW SQT meet all requirements for WSAT, the
certification processed is subject to competing demands in
other combat systems areas. Likewise, WSAT inspection
scheduling and budget controls at NAVSEA (06UT) are
relinquished under CSSQT cognizant authorities.
As of January 1992, CSSQT and ASW SQT are unfunded for the
foreseeable future with the exception of lead ships in a new
class such as the BURKE class guided missile destroyer.
3. Reduced Scope Inspections
In an effort to provide a WSAT for every ship when
due, the current effort is to develop a reduced scope
inspection which will meet certification requirements.
Specifically, the requirement for recertif ication after ROH or
DSRA is of interest because statistically these were the ship
inspections left unscheduled due to funding constraints. The
first endeavor for a reduced scope WSAT inspection was the
Surface ASW System Test (SAST) . The SAST Program Manual
[Ref. 3:p. 1-2] outlines the scope of the inspection. Figure
4, taken from that manual, displays the proposed relationship


















Figure 4. Ship Life Cycle (SAST)
10
The first SAST inspection was accomplished in January 1992 at
Long Beach Naval Station, California aboard the USS PAUL F.
FOSTER (DD-964) . The SAST inspection was designed to cost
approximately one third that of a WSAT and provide a
reasonable assurance that the ASW combat system is ready for
underway operations and meets reguisite performance
specifications. Although the four phase SAST inspection is
similar to WSAT on paper, some significant differences exist.
First, a shift of emphasis from outside source technician
testing to ship's force reguires that the ship complete Phase
I dockside testing prior to the arrival of NUWES/NUSC ASW
system experts in phase II. As a result, ship's force PMS
checks now form the basis for continued testing. This
assessment is performed by the SAST team leader. This concept
removes the necessity of a WSAT team from being on travel for
the usual WSAT phase I (5-7 days) dockside tests.
Unfortunately, it shifts the foundation for ASW certification
to the command involved without regard to current ship manning
and training levels subseguent to an industrial availability
when they are historically under strength. As a result some
material categories could receive little or no attention by
the more gualified NUSC/NUWES engineers in phase II, based on
erroneous testing by ships force early in phase I.
Additionally, the phase IV WSAT 3-D range firing exercises are
eliminated. This concept eradicates the total system end-to-
end test deemed important by the fleet as well as test
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engineers. Also, it is unclear if anywhere in SAST an effort
is made to scientifically determine where to concentrate
scarce inspection dollars based on material discrepancy trends
or histories. The latest endeavor at NAVSEA in restructuring
WSAT, currently in the planning stage only, is referred to as
the Consolidated ASW Test (CAT) program. The current surface
ship ASW test plan POA&M is shown in Figure 5.
SURFACE SHIP ASW COMBAT SYSTEM
CERT PROGRAM POA&M
DEC 91 Establish mimimum trial requirements
JAN 92 Define dockside requirements (Pt 1, Pt 2)
Underway requirements
FEB 92 Prepare typical PMS test pkg (for dockside Pt 1)
MAR 92 Review PMS test pkg (TYCOMs. NAVSEA)
APR 92 Prelim test plan & daily schedule
MAY 92 Review test plan/schedule (by TYCOMs, NAVSEA)
JUN 92 Final/approved test plan/schedule
JUL 92 Schedule first ship for CAT trials
AUG 92 Brief first ship on CAT
OCT 92 Conduct first CAT trials
OCT 92/ Monitor, evaluate effectiveness of CAT
DEC 92 Propose revisions and improvements
Figure 5. ASW Test Program POA&M
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The goal of the CAT program appears similar to SAST in that it
will define the post-shipyard ASW combat system certification
program for surface ships. The program will meet OPNAV
reguirements to consolidate redundant inspections as well as
address fleet concerns for collateral training opportunities
alongside NUSC/NUWES technicians in both operations and
maintenance. The process is currently under Total Quality
Leadership (TQL) review to provide guality performance
indicators which measure effectiveness and ensure ongoing
program improvement. The lessons learned from the only SAST
inspection performed will be incorporated by increasing
NUSC/NUWES supervision during phase I dockside testing. As in
SAST, increased reliance on ships force personnel in
conducting selected maintenance checks will be utilized. This
program will attempt to incorporate the existing ship PMS
schedule with results from applicable shipyard testing to
reduce or eliminate redundant and excessive testing. However,
the program core testing reguirements do not specify any
analysis of systems discrepancy histories in regard to
constructing individual ship test packages. Similar to SAST,
elimination of 3-D range torpedo exercises are sacrificed in
lieu of simulated ASROC, OTS, and LAMPS exercises.
13
4. Ramifications and Concerns
The overall thrust of the new ASW systems test program
appears to make the best of a bad situation with regard to
budget shortfalls. Funding of testing for new construction
BURKE class guided missile destroyers will undoubtedly be
preserved, the problem lies with recertifying the aging
SPRUANCE and PERRY class ships. Likewise, the AEGIS cruisers
of the TICONDEROGA class will also require some type of
recertification inspection as they progress through their life
cycle. The last ship of this class was commissioned in July
1992. The shifting of testing prerequisites to ships force as
a prelude to ASW certification will pose another scheduling
problem for afloat commands. This problem can be minimized by
adequate involvement of the type commander and NAVSEA when
planning ship overhauls. Additional efforts on the part of
the ship will be required to ensure a core of sufficiently
trained technicians are onboard at certification time. This
will minimize possible compromise of initial phase dockside
testing by unqualified technicians under pressure to meet
schedule deadlines. A resounding need for ongoing statistical
analysis in material category reliability is called for to
prevent planned testing initiatives from risking overlook of
problematic areas in construction of a ship test package.
14
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
1. Material Discrepancy Data Analysis
With the substantial data available on WSAT ASW combat
system material discrepancies, the first objective of this
thesis is to perform a categorical data analysis to reveal
which material categories are most prone to failure. This
would refute an implicit assumption that all material
categories are uniformly degraded and that reduced scope
inspections need not statistically consider system material
histories during program conception.
2 . WSAT Data Base Examination
The second objective of this thesis will be a critical
examination of the existing WSAT data base. This examination
will include recommendations for future modifications to the
data base; primarily with respect to the deletion and addition
of specific data fields. These recommendations will be biased
toward what will be reguired to make the data base a viable
tool in future statistical analysis.
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II. WEAPON SYSTEM ACCURACY TRIAL (WSAT) DATA
A. DATA COLLECTION
1. Experience Tour
During the six week ASW curriculum experience tour in
quarter 5 of 8 , several invaluable point of contacts were made
to facilitate WSAT thesis data collection. Mr. Edward Biery
of NUWES detachment Keyport, WA. (code 56) was sponsor of the
experience tour. It was his office from which most background
information on the WSAT program was obtained. That office
arranged a visit to NAVSEA (06UT) , Washington, D.C. to meet
senior civilian engineers in the ASW test program as well as
STGCS(SW) W.J. Vick, developer of the NAVSEA ASW test program
data base. During this visit NAVSEA policies and goals with
respect to the WSAT program were discussed and clarified.
2 . Data Sources
The actual data for use in this analysis was obtained
from various subordinate activities to NAVSEA. Specifically,
the data was obtained in naval message format from the
following activities:
• Pacific Fleet Data
1. NUWES detachment, San Diego, CA. (code 906), Mr. Alex
Rios (Head ASW Analysis Division)
.




• Atlantic Fleet Data
1. NUSC Newport, R.I. (code 38), Mr. John Peters (ASW
Test Analyst)
A summary of the WSAT data received for this analysis is
provided in Figure 6.
WSAT DATA SOURCES
BY SHIP TYPE













SURFACE SHIP WSAT DATA (5 YEARS)




A total of 64 WSAT final inspection report messages
covering the last five years were obtained from cognizant
inspection activities for use in this analysis. The data
represents both Pacific and Atlantic fleet surface assets
which have ASW as one of the command primary warfare areas.
The last five years of data was chosen for this analysis:
1. To minimize interruption of business at the various
inspection activities who were called on to locate,
reproduce, and ship the data.
2. To minimize wasteful receipt of older data which is
representative of ships scheduled for upcoming
decommissioning
.
The 64 final report messages contain a total of 595 inspection
discrepancies. These data elements chosen for analysis are a
representative population sample of all WSAT discrepancies.
Each data element represents a failed maintenance inspection
or operational check. For purposes of the categorical data
analysis to be discussed in Chapter IV, each check is the
result of a failed binomial experiment. The sampled data was
further assigned to one of five specific material categories.
The categories were not chosen arbitrarily, but rather were
chosen per the prescribed categorical reporting format of the
final report message described in NAVSEA OD 40087. With all
inspection reports describing both major and minor
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discrepancies in this manner, aggregation of all data elements
into appropriate categories became a less arduous
administrative task in bookkeeping.
2. Data Categories
To clarify which material discrepancies belong to
specific categories, a breakdown is summarized as follows:
• Category I (Sonar Systems)
1. Hull mounted sonar systems
2
.
Towed array sonar systems
3. Signal processing systems
• Category II (ASW Aviation Systems)
1. Sonobuoy systems
2. ASW helicopter data link systems
3. Torpedo loading, arming, and presetter systems
• Category III (Weapons Delivery Systems)




Asroc box launcher systems
3. Asroc guided missile launcher systems
4. Asroc vertical launch systems
• Category IV (ASW Fire Control Systems)
1. The Mk-114 analog fire control system
2. The Mk-116 digital fire control system
3. The USCG Mk-309 fire control system
19
• Category V (ASW Sensor Subsystems)
1. The ship electromagnetic log
2. Ship gyroscope and inertial navigation systems
3. ASW related command decision systems (CDS/NTDS)
4. ASW related gunfire control radars and systems
5. ASW related consoles and repeaters
C. DATA SUMMARY PRESENTATION
For presentation of the data by categories bar graphs were
chosen for relative comparisons between material categories.
For this analysis the data is broken down by Atlantic and




N = 261 DISCREPANCIES
SONAR SYS. AVIATION SYS. WEAPONS SYS. RC. SYS. SENSOR SUBSYS.
h so to m a
SURFACE SHIP WSAT DATA (5 YEARS)





N = 334 DISCREPANCIES
SONAR SYS. AVIATION SYS. WEAPONS SYS. F.C. SYS. SENSOR SUBSYS.
62 26 93 63 90
SURFACE SHIP WSAT DATA (5 YEARS)







N = 595 DISCREPANCIES
SONAR SYS. AVIATION SYS. WEAPONS SYS. F.C. SYS. SENSOR SUBSYS.
117 66 163 130 120
SURFACE SHIP WSAT DATA (5 YEARS)
Figure 9. Navy Wide WSAT Data
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III. THE WSAT DATA BASE
A. DATA BASE RESPONSIBILITY
The WSAT data base is managed by the NAVSEA ASW test
program office (NAVSEA 06UT) . It is the product of efforts by
STGCS(SW) W.J. Vick, USN. It was designed to be an all
inclusive information system containing relevant historical
information concerning ASW testing conducted by NAVSEA on both
surface ships and submarines. Additionally, it is intended to
be used as an aid in forecasting future testing requirements
based on long range ship repair and conversion plans. The
information in the centralized data base is compiled from many
different sources. The data base is currently managed by Mr.
Peter Karounos (NAVSEA 06UT) who is assisted by STGCS(SW) J.
Brown, USN. As a centralized data base, NAVSEA retains
responsibilities for both data integrity and security.
B. ORGANIZATION
The latest printed edition of the WSAT ASW test data base
is dated 16 September 1991 and is organized into two parts.
Part one is information relevant to surface ships. Part two
is information relevant to submarines. Further discussion
will be limited to the surface ship section of the data base
in accordance with the scope of this analysis. As a
microcomputer based software data base management system
23
written on the commercially available PFS: Professional File
Version 2.02, the data base is easily learned and manipulated.
G. Hanson and J. Hanson in Database Management and Design
[Ref. 4:pp 15] describes a microcomputer data base management
system as a system that demonstrates query flexibility and
ease of data base creation and maintenance. This package
meets those prerequisites. The surface ship data base
currently comprise 51 data fields of various types (ie: date,
numeric, alphanumeric, etc...). Figure 10 displays the
relevant data fields being used.
SURF
Fl-Help
Enter instructions for printing nailing labsls.
F2-Label F3-Edit F4-Quick Entry





TYCOM: PAC: LANT: GRP: SQN: PORT:
FY: QTR: PRI: CERT: SUPPORT:
AVAIL: FUND: YARD: END YARD:
LAST WSAT LAST DATE:
SCOT: LIM DIF:
CSSQT: LSQT:






















Figure 10. WSAT Data Base Fields
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C. CRITICAL EXAMINATION
PFS:Professional File is a flexible software application
package which is very similar to Data Base III. The
comprehensive use of pull down menus and on line help
functions make it quite adaptive to the novice user, yet it
also has many short cut features suited to the advanced
operator. Although the software system is more than adequate
for the job, the data base itself has several aspects needing
revision to ensure continued usefulness. Critical examination
indicates that while a basis for corporate information system
management is present, approximately 8 data fields in the data
base are either obsolete or unnecessary. This statement is
substantiated by the appalling lack of data in these fields
and the insignificance of the information in others. A
complete printed report of the entire data base requires 4
pages to intelligently convey all information on each ship.
It is obvious upon examination that the data base is primarily
an administrative aid to track ASW testing, scheduling, and
associated correspondence. Unfortunately, the usefulness of
the data base in identifying material discrepancy trends is
limited in the current format. Although the number of
discrepancies are listed for each ship inspection, it fails to
identify equipment specifics or even the associated material
categories. This information will be statistically
significant in planning future inspections or other
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certification procedures. This statement is even more true in
a time of budget shortfalls and constraints, which appear to
be a permanent fixture associated with the conclusion of the
cold war.
As future certification procedures evolve, probably based
on cost overhead, it would be imprudent to ignore material
trends where risks resulting from non-testing are too great.
The problem of manpower in maintaining the ASW test data base
might be addressed by changing from a centralized data base
management system to a distributed system connected via modem.
This would spread the chores of data entry to the requisite
inspection activities and put NAVSEA in a more supervisory
role. The network could conceivably consist of only 5 sites
which is easily manageable. With the unclassified nature of
the data base and the use of commercial phone lines, this
concept is certainly economically feasible. Specific
recommendations on data base field deletions and additions
will be included in Chapter VI of this study.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS
As the scope of the ASW test and certification program,
specifically WSAT, undergoes dynamic changes to meet funding
restrictions, the question of which material categories
historically demonstrate the most discrepancies should be
examined. If the WSAT core structure inspection is reduced
without regard to this, then it is an implicit assumption that
material degradation is homogenous throughout the five
material categories in the WSAT. Although WSAT describes
inspection discrepancies as either major or minor in nature,
this analysis will weigh all discrepancies equally for
conducting the multinomial experiment. Accordingly our N =
595 data points will be individually assigned to one of five
material categories. The variable p. will represent the
probability that any individual discrepancy belongs in
material category i (1=1 5).
A. NULL AND ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS
In order to conduct a statistical test on the data, a
specific hypothesis to be refuted must be defined. For this
analysis the null hypothesis will be that any particular
observation is equally likely to fall in any one of
27
the five WSAT material categories described in chapter II,
that is Pi=P2=P3=P4=Ps' Tne alternate hypothesis to be
substantiated via testing is that at least one category





' Pi = Pi = Pi = Pa = Ps = -20
Equation 2 summarizes the alternate hypothesis:
(1)
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS
H„ : At least one p. * .20
a r 1
(2)
B. STATISTICAL TESTING OF HYPOTHESIS
A standard test procedure for this hypothesis is described
in Devore, Probability And Statistics For Engineering And The
Sciences [Ref. 5:pp 556-559]. The name of this procedure is
the chi-squared goodness-of-f it test for categorical data.
The null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative
hypothesis if a test statistic is too large. The test
statistic is labeled a \ 2 (chi-square) statistic and is
defined in Equation 3
5 (n - e)2
x
>
. £ l^^L (3)




is the number of the total N = 595 observations that
fall into each material category i (1=1,2,3,4,5) found in
Chapter II, Figure 9. The variable e. is the expected number





= Pi(N) = (.20)(595) = 119 (4)
When the null hypothesis is true, the observed number of
category discrepancies should be close to the corresponding
expected values and the test statistic should be small.
Provided that the expected value, e-, is greater than or equal
to 5 for each category, the test statistic has a chi-squared
distribution with v = 5-1 = 4 degrees of freedom. The
decision to accept or reject the null hypothesis will be
accomplished by comparing the computed value of the test
statistic to an appropriate critical value of the chi-squared
distribution, which is tabulated and available in most
statistics text books. The critical value for the test
procedure will be determined by choosing a significance level,
a
, for the hypothesis test. The value of a is the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true.
The critical value is the 1-a percentile point of the chi-
square distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. For a =.01 and
v = 4 the tabulated critical value is 13.277.
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This means we reject our null hypothesis if the calculated
test statistic is greater than 13.277. Equations 5 through 7
summarize the Navy wide chi-square test respectively.






























0M= 13-277 Reject Ho
(7)
The conclusion, based on this test procedure, is to reject the
null hypothesis of homogenous material category degradation in
favor of the alternate hypothesis. There is very strong
statistical evidence indicating significant differences in
Navy wide WSAT material category reliability to support the
alternative hypothesis.
The next step in the analysis will be to determine if the
Atlantic Fleet data refutes the same homogenous null
hypothesis. Using observed discrepancy values from Chapter
30
II, Figure 7, the pertinent variables are summarized in
Equation 8 through 10.

























.oM =13 -277 ^'ecr ^ (10)
Accordingly, testing of the Atlantic Fleet data also supports
rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative
hypothesis that at least one p. is not equal to .20 .
The last step in the test will be to check that the
Pacific Fleet data also refutes the null hypothesis. Using
the data from Chapter II, Figure 8 the variables for the test
are summarized in Equations 11 through 13.




















= 43.82 ;> %
2
mA = 13.277 -Reject Ho (13)
Like the Navy wide data and the Atlantic Fleet data, the
Pacific Fleet data also strongly supports rejecting the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypoyhesis.
Having tested the data in the aforementioned fashion, it
is now an accurate statement to say that a homogenous
degradation in the five material categories of WSAT is false.
Chapter V will address specific recommendations on which
category to focus attention on and which categories are least
prone to failure.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. WSAT ANALYSIS
1. Conclusions
The analysis of the last five years of WSAT data
conducted in Chapter IV strongly indicates the variation in
degradation among the five material categories which comprise
WSAT. Figures 11 through 13 summarize the experiment results
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Figure 13. Navy Wide Results
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The Navy wide material categories rank from least prone to
failure to most prone to failure as follows:
• NAVY WIDE RELIABILITY RANKING
1. Aviation Systems (Cat II)
2. Sonar Systems (Cat I)
3. Sensor Subsystems (Cat V)
4. Fire Control Systems (Cat IV)
5. Weapons Delivery Systems (Cat III)
The discrepancy most common in the least reliable category was
undeniably found to be in torpedo launcher systems. Improper
tube firing voltages, firing pressures, and interface failures
were prolific in the 163 data points in this category. This
is not surprising considering the fact that most torpedo
launcher systems have at least partial exposure directly to an
ocean environment with detrimental effects on electrical and
mechanical components. Figure 14 provides for direct
comparison between Atlantic and Pacific Fleet observed
discrepancies. In 3 of 5 categories the Pacific Fleet ASW
systems demonstrate a greater propensity for failure than the
Atlantic Fleet. The largest variation found was in category
V (Sensor Subsystems) where the Pacific Fleet showed
significantly higher numbers of discrepancies than its
contemporary (90 vice 39) . Subsequent reexamination of the
data revealed a prevalence of discrepancies in NTDS/CDS
software on Pacific Fleet Ticonderoga class guided missile
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cruisers. These most recently delivered ships contain the
most current software versions which apparently are replete
with certification discrepancies. The other differences in
Fleet data are small in comparison but have no apparent
rational explanation. One would expect that uniform
technician training standards and maintenance procedures would
minimize this variance. The only other possible explanation
might be a function of East Coast and West Coast Test Activity
inspector personalities and background experience.
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION COMPARISON
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Figure 14. Fleet Data Comparison Summary
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2 . Recommendations
The following recommendations apply to the future of
the ASW Test Program:
1. Focus future inspection packages with emphasis on torpedo
tube and ASROC launcher validation by experienced
technicians.
2. Establish revised, precise tactical digital standards for
certification of software based systems.
3. If 3-D range firing exercises must be eliminated, conduct
a comprehensive study of past range data to determine
failure cause and results. Incorporate these findings in
test program development.
4. Include any available ASW PACER data in development or
assessment of a ship ASW certification.
5. Conduct ongoing statistical analysis of ASW combat
systems discrepancy trends. The CASREP data base,
maintained at the TYCOM level, is an excellent source of
current Fleet system problems.
6. Incorporate future WSAT (or eguivalent) data into ongoing
statistical analysis.
7. Conduct a study to compare WSAT historical trend results
with current Fleet equipment reliability prediction
programs such as the Trouble Systems Process developed by
Vitro Corporation.
8. Conduct a comparative study of ASW technical training
standards between Fleet training centers with a goal of
uniformity.
B. WSAT DATA BASE ANALYSIS
1. Conclusions
The critique of the existing WSAT data base in Chapter
II found a comprehensive, centralized data base requiring only
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minor modification. The key issues are to examine the
implementation of a distributed network data base and
subsequent modification of data base fields to promote
statistical analysis.
2 . Recommendations
The following recommendations apply to data base field
structure:
• Fields Recommended For Deletion
1. GRP/SQN/PORT: All of these fields are variable over a
ships life. They are available elsewhere and actually
provide little information relative to the ASW Test
Program.
2. CSSQT: This is no longer a funded program.
3. SCOT: This field contains minimal existing data which
attests to its invalidation.
4. SAST/SAST LTR: Only one inspection was conducted under
this program prior to discontinuation.
5. TDA/PHONE #: This field also has no existing data.
Test agency phone numbers are variable as shore
commands evolve and are available elsewhere.
6. REMARKS: This field exhibits minimal existing data
which attests to its invalidation.
• Fields Recommended For Addition
1. A material category discrepancy breakdown field which
would provide an adequate means of recording observed
discrepancies in an orderly fashion and promote
statistical analysis. The following numeric field
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